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The Greek government unsuccessfully battled leftist terrorist groups from 1975 to 
2002. The two most notorious terrorist organizations during this period were the 
“November 17” group and another group called, “Revolutionary People’s Struggle.” In 
1975, these organizations began a violent campaign against the United States, NATO 
personnel, Turkish diplomats, and member of the Greek political and business elite. 
The government’s failure to curtail these groups resulted from the erroneous 
belief that these terrorists were not a direct threat to Greek’s democracy. Fortunately, in 
June of 2002, with numerous arrests, Greek authorities made substantial progress and 
apprehended the leaders of the “November 17.” 
This thesis examines the nature and the effects of terrorism by focusing on the 
ideology and activities of these two specific terrorist groups. This thesis also identifies 
and analyzes the origins of thee organizations, reveals how the terrorist situation was 
created, and examines the causes that led to the inception of these terrorist organizations. 
Additionally, this thesis interprets the intelligence services in Greece before and 
after the demise of the Greek military dictatorship in 1974. It also explores how the 
intelligent community under the watchful eye of Greece’s political leadership helped 
dislodge these terrorist organizations and helped protect and consolidate the fledging 
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Killing a man is murder unless you do it to the sounds of trumpets.1 
 -Voltaire 
After almost three decades of minimal success at combating leftist terrorists, 
Greek authorities finally made headway against November 17 (17 N) in the summer of 
2002. A failed bombing attack in the port of Pireaus led Greek police to their first arrest 
of a November 17 member. Furthermore, in February 2003, the Greek police arrested 
members of the other major terrorist group in Greece, the Revolutionary People’s 
Struggle (ELA). 
How did such progress occur? Was it good fortune and coincidence or was it the 
result of highly professional efforts of the Greek authorities? For a better understanding, 
many questions must be answered. What are the origins and the historical background of 
those terrorist groups? What were the goals of 17 N and ELA, and what were they trying 
to prove? What was the response of the Greek state and its resulting legislative changes? 
What are the mission and the legal framework of the Greek Intelligence Services? What 
are the problems that are likely to emerge in a democratic country during the transition 
from an authoritarian regime to a consolidated democracy, as happened with Greece after 
Colonel George Papadopoulos’ dictatorship? What have the Intelligence Services learned 
from that conflict?  
All these questions must be answered to understand the deeper reasons for the 
success of the Greek authorities and the role that the Greek and foreign intelligence and 
security services played in dislocating those terrorist groups in that undeclared war on 
terrorism. 
This thesis examines the nature and the effects of terrorism by focusing mainly on 
the ideology and the activities of the revolutionary organization November 17 and the 
Revolutionary People’s Struggle, Greece’s most well-known terrorist organizations, 
which in 1975, started a violent campaign against the United States and North Atlantic 
                                                 
1 George Kassimeris, Europe’s Last Red Terrorists: The Revolutionary Organization 17 November, 
New York University Press, 2001, p. 1. 
1 
Treaty Organization personnel, Turkish diplomats, and members of the Greek political 
and business elite. The thesis identifies and analyzes the origins of those organizations, 
shows how the current situation was created, and explains the reasons these terrorist 
groups formed. Additionally, the thesis examines the role of the intelligence services in 
Greece after the Colonels’ dictatorship in that fragile transition from an authoritarian 
regime to a democracy, their role in uprooting those organizations and the lessons that the 
intelligence services have learned in battling the urban terrorists to protect and to 
consolidate  the democracy.    
The organization November 17 is responsible for 23 assassinations and over 140 
attacks, including mortar assaults, drive-by shootings and detonating of explosives. The 
two acts that have had the most defining impact were 17 N's first and last assassinations: 
the 1975 murder of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Athens station chief, Richard 
Welch; and the 2000 killing of the British military attaché, Brigadier Stephen Saunders.  
Between 1975 and July 2002, there were no breakthroughs, let alone criminal 
convictions, related to the numerous 17 N operations in Greece. Despite international 
attempts to help Greek authorities solve the 17 N crimes, the group remained an enigma 
for 27 years. Given the group’s changing dynamics since the early 1990s, and the 
political pressures on the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) leadership to take a 
more serious stance against 17 N, many people wondered whether the current wave of 
arrests and the evidence that emerged resulted from pure luck or coincidence.  
Furthermore, the September 11th tragedy in the U.S. revealed the broadness of the 
terrorist threats. That date also demonstrated the vulnerability not only of the U.S., but 
also of the rest the world. Security issues have become global and Greece has the 
responsibility to play a significant role in that important battlefield. For almost thirty 
years, Greece’s achievements were extremely deficient while the operations of the 
terrorist groups in Greece were quite successful. The help of the intelligence services in 




Chapter I presents the historical background of the problem and the definition of 
terrorism. These terrorists groups, known or unknown to the public, engage in mutual 
relations, which makes them more capable, yet which also makes them more vulnerable 
to the police and intelligence services.  
Therefore, exploring the origins of these terrorist organizations, their historical 
background, and the socio-political environment that fosters them is imperative. 
Moreover, their ideology must be examined in order to understand their existence clearly. 
Furthermore, the kinds of attacks they chose and their ultimate goals must be understood 
to avoid their reestablishment. Based on the empirical observations and historical 
examples, Chapter I illuminates the cases of those two major terrorist groups in Greece, 
their similarities and their differences on their way to their demise. 
Chapter II presents the methods that the Greek political community chose in order 
to battle terrorism over the last 30 years to preserve law and order; terrorism cannot be 
dealt with through institutional means alone or solely by state mechanisms. To deal with 
terrorism effectively, citizens must accept and must develop a social conscience against 
terrorism that will set aside party expediencies. In the fight against terrorism, the political 
parties are obligated to cooperate in their efforts to triumph over terrorist groups and 
because in our time, democracy can be defended only through broad participation, by 
dialogue and consent, and by the determination of all social forces to defeat its enemies.2 
The major dilemma, in such situations, is how to protect democracy without losing or 
sacrificing basic social freedoms; freedoms that have been gained by citizens after many 
years of conflicts and protests against totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.  
Consequently, Chapter II examines what anti-terrorism policies are feasible for a 
democratic state to follow. Furthermore, this chapter catalogues the steps that Greece 
took against the terrorist groups and discusses the legislative measures taken to eliminate 
these groups. Finally, this chapter explains the reasons these terrorist groups declined in 
2002 after the Greek police failed to eradicate them for nearly 30 years.   
 
                                                 
2 Dora Bakoyiannis, “Terrorism in Greece,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Spring 1995, pp. 17-28. 
3 
Chapter III analyzes the structure and the function of the intelligence services in 
Greece and role and the control that the intelligence community played during the 
democratization period just after the military dictatorship. The intelligence community 
played a crucial role, but of course, most important was their role in disrupting the 
emerging terrorist groups.  
However, before addressing the major question of how the Greek democratic 
regime can control the intelligence services through a legal framework, understanding the 
historical origin of the Greek secret intelligence services is necessary. It is also essential 
to understand its mission in modern Greek democratic society, the phases of the 
intelligence process that these intelligence services have adopted to function more 
efficiently, the structure and formation of the National Intelligence Service, and finally, 
the legal framework under which the NIS functions. 
Chapter IV examines the role of the intelligence and security services in Greece, 
not only the domestic but also the foreign services, which contributed tremendously to 
uprooting the terrorist groups. This chapter examines how control and oversight of the 
Greek services was achieved and what mechanisms the governments used for that 
purpose. This chapter also elucidates the reasons for intelligence in the modern society 
and how it aids society. This chapter also justifies the existence of those services in order 
to protect the countries from threats that could emerge anywhere today.  
The conclusion, Chapter V, reexamines the importance of the intelligence services 
in the war against terrorism and evaluates the aforementioned concepts, which clarify the 
debate and make Greece’s policy understandable. This chapter also examines any 
operations beyond their jurisdiction and legality that the intelligence services could have 
conducted against the will of a democratic society and how the Greeks avoided this after 
the collapse of the military dictatorship.   
4 
II. TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN GREECE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Almost after three decades of unsuccessfully combating various leftist terrorist 
groups from 1975 until 2002, a failure due to the belief that these groups were not a direct 
threat to the democracy, Greek authorities made incredible progress toward the discovery 
of November 17, the primary leftist group. This breakthrough came on June 29th 2002, 
when a time bomb detonated in the hands of its handler in the port of Piraeus. Because 
the police gathered forensic evidence from this bomb attack, they eventually arrested the 
first member of November 17, over 27 years after its first attack on December 23, 1975, 
and the assassination of CIA Athens station chief, Richard Welch, outside his house in 
Athens.  
This was the first time since 1996 that Greece’s Prime Minister Costas Simitis, 
declared “we have begun to unfold the mystery of November 17,”3 as the Greek law 
enforcement’s authorities seemed to have a clear picture of the structure of November 17.  
In mid-2003, the Greek government believes that the most important members of 
the organization have been arrested. Their trial began in Athens in March 2003. However, 
a series of problems has emerged. The members of the group repudiate the authority of 
the court to judge them, as they assume themselves to be political criminals, not 
terrorists, and their crimes to be political crimes.  
The trial, its procedures, and the light that will be shed on the unanswered 
questions that have troubled Greece for so many years have interested the nation greatly 
since. November 17 was the last communist terrorist organization in Europe and since 
Greek authorities failed to arrest even one of its members after nearly 30 years of 
lawlessness, a myth took shape around that revolutionary organization. 
Presently, the Greek authorities have started dislodge the other major terrorist 
group in Greece, the Revolutionary People’s Struggle (ELA), and startling revelations  
                                                 
3 Elefterotypia (Greek Newspaper), July 2, 2002 Issue. 
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have arisen about the connections between the two groups, about the way they function 
and their strategies, and eventually their connections with other terrorist organizations in 
Europe and elsewhere.    
After the lethal attacks against the United States, on September 11, 2001, the 
arrest and collapse of a terrorist group has more importance. Obviously, in our era, the 
phenomenon of terrorism has become global, escaping the narrow limits of national 
interest. The connection and the cooperation of terrorist organizations globally must be 
examined carefully during investigations and during the attempts to eliminate them. The 
attacks of September 2001 against the United States revealed the broadness of such 
threats, and even Le Monde, the French newspaper, wrote the next day on its first page, 
“We are all Americans.”4 The attacks were directed not only against the United States but 
also against all the open democratic and multicultural societies. As a result, democratic 
countries declared their support and solidarity to the Americans and their intention to 
bring the people who were responsible for the attacks before the law for the appropriate 
punishment.  
An investigation is able to show that these terrorists groups, whether or not they 
are known to the public, share interrelations that make them more deadly, but more 
vulnerable to their final elimination by national governments and police and intelligence 
services.  
Therefore, the origins of these terrorist organizations, their historical background, 
the socio-political environment, and ideology must be understood. These terrorist groups 
produced nothing apart from victims.  No one suppressed them, and they did not seek to 
liberate anyone. These terrorists took advantage of the rights and freedoms of the 
democratic regime and tried to overthrow it violently.  
Examining these issues will help other nations fight and eliminate terrorist 
organizations around the world. One must understand the issues that contribute to the 
emergence of such groups, if one hopes to eliminate them permanently. These terrorist  
                                                 
4 Le Monde (French Newspaper), September 12, 2001 Issue. 
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groups must understand that their tactics are strongly opposed by  the civilized world and 
are regarded as moral and political crimes that will never be accepted or defended by the 
modern democratic societies.  
B. DEFINITIONS OF TERROR AND TERRORISM 
Terror is a highly subjective experience and everyone has different limits and 
reasons for feeling frightened of certain experiences and images. One definition of terror 
is the unintended or derived by-product of other events that are beyond our power to 
predict or to control.5 
According to Paul Wilkinson, a Professor at the University of St. Andrews and an 
expert in the study of terrorism since the early 1970s, terrorism is the systematic use of 
coercive intimidation, usually to achieve political ends, and it is used to create and to 
exploit a climate of fear among a wider target group than the immediate victims of the 
violence, and to publicize a cause, as well as to coerce a target to accept the terrorist’s 
goals.6 Terrorism concerns the use of murder and destruction and the threat of murder 
and destruction because one way for terrorists to achieve their demands is to terrorize all 
individuals and governments.  
Even though there is no agreed upon detailed definition for terrorism, as to its 
character or type of operation, most experts agree that the element of fear is important to 
the determination of that phenomenon. Additional characteristics of the terrorist groups 
are ruthlessness, disregard for established humanitarian values, and a limitless quest for 
publicity through the mass media. The most common methods that are used by terrorists 
to achieve their goals are hijacking, hostage taking, bombings, assassinations and mass 
murders. However, terrorism is not only politically motivated. Common criminals might 
use terrorist attacks such as ransom or revenge, just to succeed in their vile goals.  
Terrorism is usually divided into two basic types: factional terrorism, which 
assumes international goals, and national or politically motivated terrorism, which 
focuses on forcing chances solely in a particular state.7 The distinction entails terrorist 
                                                 
5 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, Frank Cass Publishers, p. 51. 
6 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, Frank Cass Publishers, 
2001, p. 12. 
7 Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, p. 531. 
7 
groups that are either internationally or nationally motivated.8 Internal terrorism is 
restricted to national territory, and international terrorism is an attack beyond 
international borders, and even on a foreign target. Of course, in our modern world, 
terrorist attacks usually have international dimensions, and they are not confined to a 
single state or region. Law enforcement agencies have much more ability to control 
internal terrorists because they have the resources, authority and jurisdiction over their 
own nation.  
Terrorism and its actions are not part of a philosophy or a political movement but 
are only a method of conflict and of war, which terrorists choose to achieve their goals. 
Also, cases exist in which terrorism has been used for liberal reasons, for example in 
Cyprus and Algeria against the colonial rule of the United Kingdom and France. Yet even 
in these cases, actions like killings and bombings were not morally justified, as the basic 
rights of innocent citizens were in danger. The paradox is that even with tremendously 
lethal attacks, the terrorists’ goals have rarely been successful and terrorist attacks alone 
have not been able to overthrown democracies or even repressive regimes.  
The popularity of terrorism among the nationalists, ideological, and religious 
extremists might simply be their desire to express their hatred and desire for revenge. 
Terrorists have a tactical edge because their methods are relatively cheap, easy to 
organize, and are not considered very risky.9 
In general, terrorism as a method of warfare has the following salient 
characteristics:10 
• There are no inherently concerns about the after effects of terrorist attacks, 
• Terrorism is mainly arbitrary and unpredictable, in the minds of its victims 
and audience, and in its effects upon individuals and society, 
• Terrorism implicitly denies the recognition of all rules, principles and 
international conventions of war, 
• Terrorists’ reject all moral constraints, which is reflected in the use of 
terrible and dreadful weapons, 
• Terrorists justif                                                y politically motivated terrorism to seek revenge.  
8 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, p. 13. 
9 Ibid., p. 13. 
10 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, pp. 53-54. 
8 
Terrorists believe that they act according to a higher revolutionary morality that 
justifies all their actions, even actions that are essentially not much different from the 
actions of common criminals. They pay no attention to the generally accepted 
humanitarian principles and values and with much defiance and pride, they place 
themselves above and outside moral law. As concerns written law, they believe it to be a 
creation of the ruling class, an “international conspiracy” against their rights, their 
country, and their interests in general. 
All the above characteristics of modern terrorists groups are applicable to the case 
of November 17, the revolutionary organization that embattled Greek society.   
C. HISTORICAL, SOCIO-POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Revolutionary behavior is a part of society and cannot be studied separately from 
its social, political and ideological environment. The terrorism by leftist groups in Greece 
was the result of a complicated series of political conditions and cultural influences. 
These conditions provided the foundations upon which terrorism was established in 
Greece during the 1970s.11 Greek history during the last century and the geographic 
position of the country determined modern Greek political traditions.  
Liberal, leftist traditions, and an idea of national legitimacy shaped a 
revolutionary ideology in which violent disagreement against political rules became the 
basic mental framework around which terrorist groups tried to establish a strategy that 
could have any possibility of success. The historical endurance and importance of these 
traditions influenced the way that November 17 selected its methods of resistance and 
justified the violence of the organization. 
However, certain traumatic experiences in Greece’s political history were 
extremely different from any other country in Europe. More specifically, the Greek civil 
war from 1946 to 1949 was the culmination of a series of uneven struggles in Greek 
society between the left-wing guerrilla fighters and the right-wing government, as well as 
struggles that had begun in the mid-1920s between the political elite and the working 
                                                 
11 George Kassimeris, Europe’s Last Red Terrorists: The Revolutionary Organization 17 November, 
New York University Press, 2001, p. 8. 
9 
class.12 In the end, the government prevailed and democracy survived, mainly by the 
1947 intervention of the United States under the Truman doctrine in that conflict. Thus, 
Greece became the first battleground of the Cold War and the first victory against the 
Soviet Union and its allies.  
An anti-communism campaign and a state of political repression prevailed in the 
country and the civil war schism expanded to the population. This division became the 
main element of political life in Greece for the next thirty years. The police and the secret 
services enforced discrimination against the communists or the citizens who supported 
communism, in the civil service, the army, the police, and the universities.  Political and 
economic exclusion were widespread in society. A large police bureaucracy kept files on 
Greek citizens and the population was divided in two categories: “ethnikofrones” and 
“non-ethnikofrones,” meaning nationally minded citizens and leftists.13 That situation 
continued until the summer of 1974, the moment the dictatorship collapsed and Greece 
transitioned to democracy after seven years of military junta. 
A previous attempt to transform the nation begun during the early 1960s, with the 
victory of the liberal Center Union party in the 1963 election and had violently ended 
with the 1967 Colonels’ coup, which imposed a military regime for seven years. This 
period dramatically impacted political life in Greece and national political values and 
attitudes. At that time, the fundamental institutional pillars of the Greek political system, 
such as the throne, the army and the parliament, were terrified of the changes in the 
Greek society and to changes to the political democratization of the country. As a result, 
the army, which had a dominant role in society, decided to act and to try to determine the 
developments. 
Therefore, the coup of 1967 was in one sense, a desperate attempt by the army to 
protect its position and supremacy. The military abandoned their post-civil war role in 
Greece as simple arbitrators of internal conflicts of the ruling classes and acquired a  
                                                 
12 John O. Iatrides, Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and its Legacy, Pennsylvania University 
Press, 1995, p. 10. 
13 Minas Samatas, Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post-Civil War 
Repressive Anticommunism and the US Truman-McCarthy Era, in Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Vol. 
13, Fall-Winter 1986, p. 35. 
10 
prevailing role and position in the power structure in order to reorganize the country’s 
political life by extinguishing the conditions of anarchy and chaos that were omnipresent 
in Greek politics.14 
However, eventually and fortunately for Greece, the military dictatorship 
collapsed in the summer of 1974. This collapse of the military junta came as a cumulative 
result of the economic crisis from 1972 to 1973, the student uprising of November 1973 
in the Athens Polytechnic, and the Turkish military invasion in Cyprus in the summer of 
1974. The outcome of this invasion was losing the northern part of the Cyprus Island and 
the perpetuation of that tense situation until today, even though the United Nations’ 
Security Council has condemned the possession of that region by Turkey, with many 
resolutions.  
At a deeper level, the military junta in Greece collapsed because it failed (like 
most authoritarian models of government) to establish an apolitical system with the 
appearance of legitimacy that could follow the military regime.15 
A mixture of continuity and change marked the 1974 transition (metapolitefsi), 
from an authoritarian rule to a democratic constitutional order. The Greek conservative 
party (New Democracy) came into power for two consequent periods until 1981, when 
the socialist party (PASOK-Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement) won the national elections. 
During the years of conservative governance, a new constitution was 
implemented, the communist party was legalized, junta sympathizers were expelled from 
the armed forces and the junta’s leaders were prosecuted for their crimes.  However, there 
were no systematic purges of the civil-military bureaucracy, the police apparatus and key 
sectors of the state. Also, in 1980, Greece became a full member of the European 
Economic Community (EEC). This gave a new potential to the Greek economy and 
policy because Greece gained power in the international arena through its participation in 
the EEC. 
                                                 
14 George Kassimeris, Europe’s Last Red Terrorists: the Revolutionary Organization 17 November, p. 
21. 
15 Ibid., p. 23. 
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The political and economic elements, however, remained in the hands of the old 
order. The main reason for this was the need for political stability, economic growth, and 
defenses against Turkey, which had once again become a crucial factor in Greek foreign 
affairs, as Turkey was regarded as a permanent threat. 
PASOK’s victory in the 1981 election ended almost half a century of right-wing 
political monopoly, and it was the first socialist government that Greece had ever had.16  
The promised change in political life (Allaghi) that PASOK promised Greek society was 
not delivered. Many indications of compromise between the rhetoric and the reality of the 
societal problems became clear.    
Symptoms of arrogance became clear, symptoms like corruption and bribery and 
from 1990 onwards, the use of scandals and ethical accusations became an accepted 
feature of Greek political life. Accusations of political abuse, corruption and economic 
waste had a tremendously negative impact on the public spirit.17 
The events that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and other regimes in 
Eastern Europe, the Yugoslav crisis, and the emergence of the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (FYROM), a country considered by the Greeks to be a serious threat to 
Greece itself, complicated the political and international environment. The outcome of 
these problems was a general crisis and discontent of the Greek citizens about the 
political process and a loss of faith in the political parties that left their corrupt signs on 
society. 
D. NATURE AND GOALS OF THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
Almost 95 identified left-wing terrorist groups appeared in Greece after the 
collapse of the dictatorship and the transition to democracy, but only two, 17 N and ELA, 
were important and their actions had severe implications on the entire society.   
The Revolutionary Organization November 17 (17 N) and the Revolutionary 
People’s Struggle (Epanastatikos Laikos Agonas-ELA), the two most significant 
n post-dictatorial Greece, used direct violence to force revolutionary organizations i                                                 
16 George Th. Mavrogordatos, The Rise of the Green Sun: The Greek Election of 1981, Centre of 
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17 George Kassimeris, Europe’s Last Red Terrorists: the Revolutionary Organization 17 November, p. 
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political change. These two extreme-leftist terrorist groups emerged in the mid-1970s, in 
a political system that “not only provided fewer civil and political rights to its citizens but 
also was unable to focus attention on, identify, and locate the real obstacles to effective 
political and social reform.”18 
The November 17 was heavily influenced by the events of the civil war, the right 
wing repressive state that prevailed in Greece for about half a century, and the military 
dictatorship, and it engaged in violence because it viewed itself as the vanguard of the 
working class, the last defender of Greek national independence.19 
The November 17 was a radical, leftist terrorist group with few members, as has 
been proved after the arrests of its members who loathed and hated the United States and 
the West because they were capitalistic and imperialistic systems. Most experts believe 
that November 17 had fewer than 25 members. The November 17, adopting the 
communist ideology, continued its anti-Western stance even after the Cold War. It was 
fundamentally opposed to Greek participation in NATO, to the European Union, to the 
US military bases remaining in Greece and to the Turkish military occupation of Cyprus. 
Ideologically, the group considered itself the judge, jury and executioner of those whom 
it classified as enemies of the Greek populace.20 
The organization took its name from November 17, 1973; the date of the student 
uprising against the military junta at the Athens Polytechnic University, where more than 
20 students lost their lives as Greek Army tanks suppressed the protest.21 
The November 17’s initial attacks were directed at senior U.S. officials and Greek 
public figures, but during the 1980s, the group expanded its operations to include the 
bombings of ordinary citizens and property. Since 1990, its targets have also included 
foreign business and European Union facilities. The organization’s first known attack 
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came in December 1975 when the CIA’s Athens station chief was shot with a .45-caliber 
pistol, the group’s weapon of choice. Since that time, the group claimed responsibility for 
22 more assassinations and conducted over 100 attacks against carefully selected and 
mostly heavily protected targets. Clearly, the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
communism had no deterring effect on the group’s motivations and actions because they 
did not consider the collapse of the Soviet Union as a collapse of their Marxist ideology.  
ELA was the other major radical leftist group, strongly anti-capitalistic and 
opposed to imperialist domination, exploitation and oppression. Its ideology was mainly 
anti-American and its intentions were to force the U.S. military forces to leave Greece. 
According to its manifesto, “the conflagration that will eventually lead to the overthrow 
of the capitalist regime will be a long, hard and violent armed struggle.”22 The group’s 
primary goal was to establish a specific strategy of attack and a political line, which 
would have the ability to make it easier to unite all the groups that were against the 
capitalist system.  
The group viewed itself as a part of the international movement that regarded 
concepts and regimes, such as imperialism, capitalism and fascism, as the same enemy 
with various faces. ELA carried out hundreds of non-lethal bombings at symbolic 
material targets and tried to present its violence as a way to respond to material 
constraints, while it simultaneously rejected the possibility of building socialism and 
communism from the existing political system.23 ELA believed that the countries of 
Western Europe were the crucial battlefield in the conflict between the international 
proletariat and the imperialist bourgeoisie and also regarded the events of November 
1973 in the Athens Polytechnic as incompleted. Its view was that an armed struggle was 
necessary to complete the revolution. 
Certainly, their campaigns, tactics, strategies and targets varied greatly, but one 
major difference existed between the 17 N and ELA: the latter was considered one 
terrorist group that was capable of being infiltrated. Unlike 17 N, which issued only  
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communiqués, ELA, used an underground publication, a magazine called Counter-
Information (Antipliroforissi), to outline its politico-military strategy and to educate its 
sympathizers.24 
In the late 1970s, the Greek populace had no desire to support a revolution. On 
the contrary, after seven years of dictatorship, the people and the country deeply desired 
political and social stability, a stability that could lead the country to a better future as 
well as prosperity on a level equal to Western Europe. 
The actual political environment in Greece was much different from the 
environment that existed in the minds of the terrorists. Their aim was to overthrow the 
democracy by violence, and they attempted to blackmail society and its institutions with 
fear and terror in the hope that they could lead the nation toward totalitarianism.25 
The two major terrorist organizations, 17 N and ELA, misinterpreting the desires 
of the entire population and the political situation, decided that the time was ripe to 
continue to spread the “revolution,” which had begun in November 1973. Their final goal 
was establishing a purely socialist society whose success would only occur by an armed 
struggle.  
E. DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATIONAL PHASES OF THE GROUPS 
The groups, (mainly November 17), responded to national and international 
challenges, in three phases: 1975 to 1980, 1980 to 1990, and 1990 to 2002.   
1. Phase One: 1975 to 1980 
The November 17’s terrorist activities started differently from the other European 
ultra-left terrorist groups. They operated in Athens solely and almost never attempted to 
expand their sphere of influence on a national level. Even more, relying on assassinations 
was not a gradual decision. Instead, they started their campaign abruptly by murdering 
their targets. Contrarily, the Red Brigades in Italy persisted for seven years and two 
operational phases before they began killing their victims.26 
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The November 17 appeared for the first time on December 23, 1975, when they 
stalked and assassinated Richard Welch, the CIA’s station chief in Athens. Twelve 
months after the attack on Welch, they murdered a former police captain during the 
Colonel’s junta. Ten days after that last murder, the French newspaper, Liberation, 
published the group’s communiqué in which the terrorists claimed credit for the attacks 
and explained the operation in detail.27 During this first phase, the terrorist attacks were 
deliberately designed to link the group with the concerns of the Greek masses and to 
capitalize on the public perceptions of the United States’ complicity in establishing the 
Greek military dictatorship and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Hence, November 17 
targeted symbolic enemies of the Greek populace, such as members of the U.S. 
intelligence community and members of the junta’s police and military apparatus.  
Likewise, in April 1977, they released their 28-page manifesto, titled “A 
Response to Political Parties and Organizations.” In that, they perceived all mainstream 
political parties as being either myopic or repressive, accused the Greek state of being an 
American vassal, and presented their belief that Greece needed violence in order to 
change. At the same time, the group denounced finance capital, a consumer society and 
parliamentary democracy. According to them, no peaceful transition to socialism could 
occur. Revolutionary violence had to ensue as a response to right-wing pressure and 
declining working class radicalism.  
All the victims of this period were shot with the same .45-calibre weapon, which 
became the group’s signature weapon. By using this weapon, the group ensured that no 
other terrorist group could take credit for its actions.28 
2. Phase Two: 1983 to 1990 
PASOK’s election victory in 1981, which was repeated in the 1986 election, 
ended almost 50 years of right-wing political monopoly and brought the socialists into 
power with promises of a dramatic break from the recent past. The socialists launched a 
number of positive and long overdue social and legal reforms, namely, the recognition of  
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national resistance, the abolition of the remaining civil-war legislation, the establishment 
of the National Health System, the creation of equality between men and women, and the 
institution of civil marriages.  
Furthermore, the socialists amended the constitution and adopted a foreign policy 
that was not pro-United States, evoking emotions of national pride on the left. However, 
during those years, the state’s economic performance was poor. The insistence on 
maintaining generous wage and welfare payments at a time of stagnant growth drove 
public-sector borrowing to record levels, enlarged the already bloated public-sector, and 
created higher public deficits and double-digit inflation. At the same time, persistent 
public protests against PASOK’s confused foreign policy, specifically over the renewal 
of the agreement for U.S. bases, created problems for the government.29 
From October 1981 to November 1983, November 17 did not perpetrate any 
terrorist activities or release any documents, leading the intelligence services, the police, 
and the mass media to presume that the organization had dissolved. Assassinating the 
head of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group in Greece (JUSMAGG), Captain George 
Tsantes, USN, along with his driver on November 15, 1983, proved the exact opposite.  
In a seven page communiqué, the group explained its three years of silence and its 
belief that PASOK has abandoned socialism and betrayed the people’s trust. U.S. bases 
were still on Greek soil, and Greece had not exited NATO and EEC contrary to the 
socialists’ promises prior to their election in 1981.  
The November 17 used that assassination as an occasion to declare war against 
the Americans, and the perceived servants of the ruling bourgeoisie class and 
imperialism,30 inaugurating a campaign of violence to remove them from Greece. Their 
targets now also became the political establishment, mainly the New Democracy party 
and PASOK, and the mass media. In February 1985, the first victims were Nikos 
Momferatos, the publisher of the country’s largest-selling conservative newspaper and 
his driver-bodyguard. 
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Meanwhile, by the end of 1986, the rapidly worsening economic situation brought 
strong pressure from the EEC for reforms, which led to a stringent economic stabilization 
program with a freeze on wages as its dominant characteristic. The bad economic 
situation became even worse with the continuous strikes and protests against these 
austerity measures. PASOK explained its modified economic policy as an attempt to save 
the country from bankruptcy.31 
The terrorist response was almost immediate. After the killing of a 15-year old 
demonstrator by a stray police bullet, November 17 detonated a remote controlled car 
bomb aimed at a police bus. This was the first time that the group used car bombings. 
Fifteen of the 22 policemen inside the car were injured, one of them fatally. That attack 
against the police force was the bloodiest and shocked the authorities and the public, 
showing that November 17 was determined to raise the level of violence to induce mass 
casualties.32 
The years that followed were full of incidents that gave November 17 an excuse 
for the terrorists to kill again. The 1987 crisis in the Aegean Sea between Greece and 
Turkey, the War in the Gulf, and the Bank of Crete scandal became the focus of Greek 
social and political attention. Regarding the bank scandal, members of the cabinet and the 
Prime Minister himself were indicted for bribery and embezzlement. Ten months of 
ethical accusations and special court hearings polarized the Greek society, weakened the 
economy, and brought the New Democracy party into power again from 1990 to 1993.  
This time the terrorist’s targets were even higher profile. Along with the 
destruction of property and the “usual” U.S. and Greek police and military targets, 
leading Greek industrialists, Turkish diplomats, well-known Greek scientists, members of 
the judiciary, members of the cabinet and the parliament were either injured or 
assassinated. In September 1989, November 17 shot and fatally wounded Pavlos 
Bakoyiannis who became the first active politician to be targeted, and the entire political 
establishment of the country was horrified by this act.33 
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In addition, the nation was horrified at the assassination of Pavlos Bakoyiannis, 
the chief parliamentary spokesman of the conservative New Democracy party and son-in-
law of its leader who became the Greek Prime Minister one year after the murder. The 
group used that murder, in particular, to send a clear warning against “the corrupt and 
rotten establishment,” and to further destabilize the state and dictate the course of events. 
Also, in order to divide public opinion further, due to the political instability that 
occurred in Greece at that time, the group declared in a statement “the worsening 
parliamentary instability crystallized the political and social ills of the last two decades in 
the country.”34 
3. Phase Three: 1990 to 2002 
In April 1990, after three elections in ten months, the New Democracy party 
managed to form a government with a parliamentary majority of one. The November 17 
ideological antipathy toward the new government was fortified by the state’s dogmatic 
free market approach that followed. The new government proceeded with the 
privatization of a large part of the public sector and the closing of the heavily indebted 
industries under state control. This policy was to be followed by the socialists when they 
again came into power three years later. The programs adopted by the Greek 
governments in the 1990s allowed Greece to become the 12th member of the European 
Monetary Union in 2000 and to become the 26th richest country in the world by the end 
of 2001. 
The terrorists responded to both conservative and socialist government’s 
programs, “the policy of selling out Greece” in their words, by striking the offices of 
multinational companies, British and American banks and businessmen, the Finance 
Minister and his main advisor in 1992, Turkish diplomats, and ship owners. 
Simultaneously, the major international issues, such as the Gulf War, the crisis in 
the former Yugoslavia and the abduction of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader, 
Abdullah Ocalan, created a new situation for the terrorists.  These terrorists felt that it 
was their obligation to respond in their own way to these situations, to these imperialistic 
actions of the West, and to the betrayal of the Greek socialist government. Consequently, 
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they conducted several attacks against Western targets involved in the war against Iraq. 
From 1994 to 2000, only two executions occurred. The rest of the attacks were low-level 
bombings and rocket attacks.  Many of them failed due to obsolete ordnance.    
The last terrorist victim was the British military attaché in Athens Brigadier 
Stephen Saunders, and for many people it was a crucial mistake of the organization. This 
occurred on June 8, 2000. That murder was the group’s response to NATO’s campaign in 
the former Yugoslavia. By attacking Saunders, November 17 considered that it attacked 
the inherent arrogance of the Anglo-Saxon political and military establishment and its  
“deeply-rooted belief that they are superior people and are therefore legalized to 
annihilate pariah nations through sanctions and bombardment, bringing misery, disease 
and death upon innocent people.”35 
Eventually, an incredible breakthrough occurred on June 29th 2002, when a time 
bomb detonated in the hands of handler in the port of Piraeus. Though this mail handler 
was injured, the bomb failed to reach its destination and this attack eventually led Greek 
police to the arrest of the first member of November 17, nearly 27 years since their first 
assassination of CIA Athens station chief, Richard Welch, outside his house in Athens on 
December 23, 1975.  
These arrests were for many people the joyful end of that terrorist organization, 
rightfully labeled a “phantom organization.”36 Yet many people had also believed that 
bringing November 17 to justice would never be possible. 
A similar ending befell the other major terrorist group, ELA. Many arrests took 
place during 2002 in Greece, and the authorities believed that the official end of that 
group was also only a matter of time.  
The methods these terrorist groups selected to induce a revolution did nothing to 
further their cause. As a result, their mission was doomed to failure. As Alberto 
Franceschini, one of the historic founders and leaders of the Italian Red Brigades,  
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declared on Greek television in 1992, “with violence you will achieve exactly the 
opposite of what you aim for,”37 accepting the reality that armed struggle is futile, 
November 17 had to cease fire and stop the senseless killings. 
A widespread belief is that eradicating these terrorist groups came slowly because 
the Greek authorities were not imminent, direct and forceful. This hesitancy facilitated 
the terrorists, giving them the necessary time and place to further their cause and conduct 
their violence.  
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III. RESPONSE OF GREEK STATE TO TERRORISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism cannot be dealt with through institutional means alone, or solely by 
state mechanisms that hope to preserve law and order. To deal with terrorism effectively, 
everyone must accept and develop a social conscience against terrorism that will set aside 
party expediencies and self interest.38 
Greece is an especially interesting case study for terrorism as well as for anti-
terrorism policies owing to all the events that have occurred in Greece since 1975. Of 
course, after many years dealing with terrorism, after many bombings, assassinations and 
shootings, everyone might believe that the Greek authorities could find a perfect solution 
to the terrorist problem, and that they would be experts in terms of fighting against 
terrorism.  
Unfortunately, that was not the case. Despite almost three decades of terrorist 
attacks, Greek authorities were unable to arrest even a single terrorist. Furthermore, they 
were unable to obtain confirmed fingerprints of members of either group or to attain 
blood samples, strands of hair, or scraps of clothing. Not a single item of forensic 
evidence existed that could bring the terrorists closer to being arrested.39 This shameful 
record affects everyone involved in the anti-terrorism campaign in Greece. Only during 
the last few years have Greek authorities come to understand this complex situation. 
Today, methodical policies and strategies have appeared with the ultimate purpose of 
eliminating terrorism in Greece.  
In the fight against terrorism, all political parties are obliged to cooperate in their 
efforts to triumph against terrorist groups. Democracy can be defended only through 
broad participation, by dialogue and consent, and by the determination of all social forces 
to uncover its enemies.40 The major dilemma, in such situations, is how to protect  
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democracy without losing or sacrificing basic social freedoms; freedoms that have been 
gained by citizens after decades of conflicts and protests against totalitarian and 
authoritarian regimes. 
The political parties are responsible for reaching a consensus about the decisions 
and actions that they must take in order to fight terrorism. Naturally, the usefulness of 
politicians is measured by the effectiveness of their deeds, not by their good intentions.  
Moreover, a successful anti-terrorist policy is one that reduces the amount of 
terrorist violence.41 Therefore, if the level of terrorist activity is decreased or not, over 
time, under a specific policy, one should be able to determine whether that policy is, or is 
not, effective. Every policy is likely to have different impacts, different techniques and 
different outcomes in the war against terrorism.   
Consequently, this chapter will attempt to elucidate what kinds of anti-terrorism 
policies are feasible for a democratic state to follow. These policies will be used to reduce 
terrorism and to measure their effectiveness. Furthermore, this chapter lists the steps that 
Greece followed against the terrorist groups that emerged after the collapse of the 
dictatorship in 1974. This chapter also reviews the legislative measures taken to eliminate 
the terrorist groups. Finally, this chapter examines the reasons these terrorist groups 
declined during 2002 after almost three decades of unsuccessful attempts by the Greek 
police to eradicate them.   
B. POLICIES AGAINST TERRORISM 
The most usual and successful policies that are applied to the war against terrorist 
groups could be included in the following six categories:42 
• Ceasefires and negotiations with the terrorists 
• Improving economic conditions 
• Making reforms 
• Collective punishments 
• Emergency powers and other anti-terrorist legislation 
• Use of security forces 
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These policies can be divided into two types: those whose main aims are against 
the terrorists themselves, and those whose main goals are against the supporters of 
terrorists among the entire population. From the above policies, the aim of the first is to 
curtail the violence of the terrorists. The next three focuses on those who support the 
terrorists. The last two policies impact the terrorists but they also directly impact the 
general population.  
1. Ceasefires and Negotiations with the Terrorists 
The politicians in democracies have many reasons to prefer such a policy against 
any terrorist group. The first reason is that the ethics of a democratic society prefer to 
resolve conflicts through negotiations rather than by using force. The second is that the 
leaders of a terrorist group are the only people who can stop the terrorist activities with 
only a simple command. The last reason is that the results of negotiations are a ceasefire 
and a truce, and these facts are also desirable by the society.43 Additionally, the result of 
a ceasefire is usually a decline in the level of violence, but unfortunately, the negotiations 
between governments and terrorists very rarely lead to conflict resolution because the 
demands of the terrorists are extremely radical, with no margin for compromises and 
eventually, the discussions end in failure and the truce ceases to exist. 
Therefore, the truth is that negotiations with terrorists are a short-term policy with 
few aspirations for permanent future resolution. Moreover, the terrorists stand to gain far 
more than the governments. 
2. Improving Economic Conditions 
There is a widespread impression that economic conditions are one extremely 
important factor that determines the size and amount of social conflict, and that the 
conflict is more possible and more serious in poorer regions than in richer areas. 
However, contrary to that perception, the reality is quite the opposite.44 Depressive 
economic conditions are seldom connected with terrorism, and inexplicably, the opposite 
more readily happens. Research and statistics reveal that greater terrorist activities have 
occurred during good economic conditions. 
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3. Making Reforms 
Another very popular point of view, in terms of terrorist activities, is that violence 
is a result of popular grievances and the removal of these grievances through reforms 
decreases violence.45 It is true that reforms have the ability to change the situation, but 
reformation is a procedure requiring time. Thus, it is a long-term solution. Besides, 
politicians must bear in mind that concessions made from a position of weakness can 
increase terrorist violence.  
4. Collective Punishments 
This method has been used many times throughout history and the indications are 
that it might reduce the level of violence for only that specific region, and only the first 
time that such a policy is applied. Another characteristic of this policy is that eventually 
the violence moves from one area to another. Therefore, the amount of violence does not 
decrease. 
5. Emergency Powers and Other Anti-Terrorist Legislation 
Quite interesting is the fact that the emergence of terrorism is more possible in 
democratic states than in totalitarian or authoritarian regimes.46 The democratic states 
face the dilemma that the powers, which have the ability to defeat terrorism, are almost 
the same that are central to the existence of the non-democratic regimes. 
The most typical measures that a democratic society takes in an emergency 
situation are:47  
• control the possession of firearms,  
• require that civilians carry their identification cards,  
• strengthen security forces to arrest and to search without pressing charges,  
• impose curfews,  
• establish special courts and procedures to try those who are accused of 
terrorist offences.  
Such anti-terrorist laws often impose draconian penalties upon those who are 
convicted of terrorist offences to deter and to curtail basic political rights, such as free 
speech and the right of assembly. 
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Imposing emergency powers at least, demonstrates that the state has recognized 
the severity of the situation and is determined to do something about it. In the same sense, 
terminating these measures indicates that the state is finally in control of the situation and 
no further state of emergency is necessary. The most important question about a state of 
emergency may not be whether or not it is necessary, but rather concerns the use of these 
powers and their impact on the democracy when the emergency ends. 
6. Use of Security Forces 
The important role played by security forces is indicated by the attempts made to 
increase their capabilities, to increase their numbers, to improve their special training and 
their special equipment, and to reorganize their structures. However, the two most usual 
tactics of security forces, patrolling and indiscriminate mass searches, produce poor 
results, and the increased military activities do not demonstrate any decrease in terrorist 
activities, as military activities and terrorist violence are significantly and strongly 
associated. 
C. THE REASONS FOR THE DECLINE OF TERRORISM 
Even with the existence of such a large number of policies against terrorism, the 
reason for the decline in terrorism is still rather unclear. The decline in terrorism and the 
end of terrorism mainly concerns public opinion. Many reasons abound as to what 
eliminates a terrorist group, and the interpretations are often quite different. 
For many people and experts on terrorism issues, the growth of terrorism is 
directly linked to the development of modern mass media communication.48 The 
relationship between terrorists and the media provides benefits to both. Terrorists want 
publicity and want to communicate a message. The mass media desire more readers and 
viewers. Therefore, by decreasing the terrorists’ access to the mass media, the terrorists 
will lose part of their power.  
Another popular perception regarding the decline of terrorism assumes that 
terrorism would end if governments consistently adopted hard-line policies and 
coordinated their international implementation.49 However, experts believe that terrorism 
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would cease to exist by changing the terrorists’ perceptions of its legitimacy50 because 
terrorism can end when the means no longer justify the ends desired. Other authors 
assume that terrorism would end if the social and economic conditions that actually 
created it could be improved, or the conditions and structural conditions of the Western 
societies, which actually permit it, could change. This view supposes that terrorism is a 
remnant of feudalism51 with its origins rooted in history. Thus, terrorism is also a product 
of these roots, and as such, is an inevitable part of our society. 
Unfortunately, all these theories do not explain the reasons terrorism decreases. 
Many flaws and omissions in these theories are apparent when this issue is thoroughly 
examined in great detail. What seems more obvious and plausible is the fact that the 
decline of terrorism appears to be related to the interplay of three factors: the 
government’s response to terrorism, which is not restricted to preemption or deterrence; 
the strategic choices of the terrorist organization, and its organizational dynamics.52 
By “the government’s response” to terrorism, we mean the physical defeat of 
terrorists such as destroying its structure, removing its leaders, or blocking the 
recruitment of new members with policies and reforms that deprive terrorists of these 
advantages. By “the strategic choices of the terrorist organization,” we mean the group’s 
decision to abandon a terrorist strategy and to follow other milder policies, with no 
assassinations, kidnappings and bombings with the appearance of more suitable or 
justifiable tactics. Finally, by “organizational dynamics,” we mean the group’s 
organizational disintegration, the disagreements over common strategy, the struggle for 
power among the many leaders, the divisions among the group and defections to other 
rival groups, or the establishment of a new, more extreme organization.   
Analyzing the perceptions of terrorists, regarding government policies and 
popular attitudes is essential to understanding the miscalculations that discredit terrorism 
before its supporters, provoke internal dissension, and justify government repression.53  
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Terrorist groups, many times, do not have the ability and clear thinking to understand and 
to recognize their approaching failure, but when their actions lose any justification 
whatsoever in the eyes of the public, their strategy has certainly outlived its usefulness.  
In the case of Greece, two of the above factors played significant roles in the 
demise of the two major leftist terrorist organizations: their physical defeat by the 
government and their organizational disintegration. 
D. GREEK RESPONSE TO TERRORISM 
Greece never used all the existing policies and techniques in their war against 
terrorists, as the Greek state never considered these groups as an imminent threat to the 
democratic regime and to the society at large. The most important instruments available 
to Greek authorities were the anti-terrorist laws that the state passed over the years. 
The most possible explanation for such a policy, even though the number of 
terrorist attacks and assassinations increased is the fact that 17 N never enjoyed public 
support. They were always considered even in the communist party, an ultra-left terrorist 
anachronism, an extremely radical, old-fashioned group. Until the mid-1980s, domestic 
incidents of terrorism were regarded as casual events perpetuated by isolated anarchic 
agitators rather than a sustained campaign of violence directed at the Greek government 
and its allies. Greece was never considered to be in an emergency status that would 
require activating the emergency powers provision of its constitution, and the armed 
forces were never used in counter-terrorist operations, even though very important anti-
terrorist legislation was passed. 
An obvious problem in the Greek political system was the lack of a consensus on 
different point of views from the two major political parties, PASOK and the New 
Democracy, the ruling powers during the last years. The New Democracy party in 1978 
and 1990 passed anti-terrorist laws, with the desire to confront and to eliminate terrorism; 
anti-terrorist laws, which were abolished by the PASOK governments as soon as they 
gained power in 1981 and 1993.   
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More specifically, the first attempt to deal with the problem came in 1978 when 
the New Democracy government introduced special anti-terrorist legislation called the 
“Bill to Combat Terrorism and Protect Democratic Polity” (Law 774/1978).54 
However, this bill was passed not only because of the perceived threat of 17 N 
after the assassination of the CIA controller in Athens and the bomb attacks by ELA, but 
more as a response to the kidnapping of Aldo Moro and the rising number of terrorist 
episodes in neighboring Italy. Likewise, the bill was mainly based on the Italian and 
German anti-terrorism bills, with one difference. It did not increase police powers in the 
areas of search and seizures, opening mail, examining bank records or detaining 
individuals without specific charges. 
Throughout the parliamentary debate, defining what precisely constitutes 
terrorism and terrorist groups polarized the discussion. The fear was that a lack of a strict 
definition of terrorism made the legislation dangerous, and it was characterized as the 
first step toward a tyrannical rule since the modus operandi of the state had not changed. 
Much selective right-wing ideological bias still remained in the state’s apparatus.  
PASOK especially, characterized the bill as the first step toward a despotic, undemocratic 
and tyrannical rule of law.55  The party concluded that Law 774/1978 was “clearly not 
about terrorists but aimed instead at putting in place the ideological and political 
conditions to terrorize the Greek populace.”56 
Furthermore, the public did not receive the anti-terrorist legislation positively. It 
legitimized the “stool pigeon” practice, a nightmare for the left since the civil war era, 
and created a lot of concern over potential civil liberties infringements and restrictions. 
The Greek state, and mainly society, was still recovering from the military dictatorship. 
Hence, in 1983, nineteen months after the socialists came to power, they 
abolished this legislation, considering it dangerous and unnecessary and did not replace it 
with other legislation. As the Minister of Justice, Georgios-Alexandros Mangakis, 
declared “what we have in this country is not terrorism but isolated episodes of terrorism 
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like the ones experienced by nearly all nations, even the most peaceful as Austria and 
Switzerland. For it is nowadays no longer for a country not to have endured some form of 
political violence.”57 Interestingly, the bill did not have any deterrent effect since there 
were 222 subsequent incidents of terrorism. 
When the socialists came to power, they tried to modernize the intelligence and 
security forces with the help of British experts who arrived in Athens in 1985 and trained 
their Greek counterparts for more than six months. However, although the Greek 
intelligence services seemed to be impenetrable from Soviet spies and neutralized the 
other major Greek terrorist group, ELA, their efforts did not lead to the arrest of any 17 N 
members. 
The Greek Parliament passed a tough and controversial anti-terrorism law in 
1990, Law 1916/1990, under the conservative majority, after the murder of Pavlos 
Bakoyiannis, the chief parliamentary spokesman of the New Democracy party. It was the 
first time that a member of parliament had become a target of a terrorist group. The new 
draconian bill 1916/1990 or “Bill for the Protection of the Society against Organized 
Crime,” embodied all the provisions of the previous Law 774/1978, with the exception of 
the death penalty. Moreover, it increased police powers in the areas of intelligence 
gathering, gave the right to the police to detain individuals for fifteen days without 
specific charges and evidence if disclosures might harm the investigation, protected the 
judges and their families, increased the reward offered for police informers, and forbade 
the press from publishing declarations from the terrorist groups. “The media are the 
terrorists’ best friend,”58 Walter Laqueur once said and in Greece, many believed that 
there was a special relationship between the terrorists and the media.  
Alexandros Katsandonis, formerly a Professor of Penal Law and one of the 
country’s most eminent legal experts, stated:59 
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17 November, ELA and …similar terrorist groups enjoy the easiest means 
of communication with the Greek people. They quite comfortably draft 
their proclamation or their declaration concerning their ideas or their 
positions regarding the crimes they have committed, they place the text in 
the wastebasket of …some public urinal, and reveal by telephone to this or 
that newspaper the location of the valuable text. And the next day the 
positions of the ELA or of November 17 are circulated in eight columns 
on the first page, to be known to the further corner of the nation. 
Therefore, the new anti-terrorist law turned the media community against the 
government because until 1990, it had enjoyed an absolute degree of freedom and had so 
far presented terrorism irresponsibly and sophistically by advertising the exclusivity of 
communiqués and conveying the terrorist propaganda. In Greece, events proved that 
political parties, the media, journalists, and other social institutions could not come to an 
agreement on the role of the mass media in coping with that extreme danger to society.  
The PASOK and the Greek communist parties saw the bill as another attempt to 
degenerate the country’s democratic institutions and as a threat to civil liberties. For the 
socialists, the parallels that the right-wing government tried to impose with other 
European states, such as Italy and France, could not be developed simply because there 
was a distinctive difference in both historical conditions and ideological trends.60 
Furthermore, it also did not have any deterrent effect since 31 attacks were executed. 
Hence, the bill was abolished in 1993 by the socialists without being replaced by other 
legislation. 
During the 1990s, no terrorist had been arrested, killed or injured in an operation 
or as a result of action by the security forces. However, there had been incidents in which 
the presence of the police made the attack impossible. With the help of the FBI and 
Scotland Yard, a think-tank and expect Greek security forces were created. Money and 
resources were allocated to them, but the frequent changes in their leadership (eight anti-
terrorist branch chiefs between 1989 and 1998)61 and constant shifts of policy and 
structure impeded the implementation of a cohesive and common approach to terrorist 
activity. However, the patterns of the attacks during the last decade, mainly low-level 
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bombings and mortar attacks and only two gun-and-run attacks indicated operational 
decline. Likewise, the failure of ordnance indicates obsolete weaponry, a lack of funding, 
and an inability to penetrate police stations and army barracks in order to acquire new 
weaponry.  
Since 2001, a new bill, an anti-terrorist law, has been in force. This law includes 
the protection of witnesses, their anonymity, name changes, or having their identities 
changed forever, favorable treatment or even exemption or release for anyone who 
provide valuable testimonies. Only those who have taken part in murders, robberies, and 
examination of bank accounts and DNA records are exempt. Due to this anti-terrorist 
law, the members of 17 N went to trial in February 2003. 
To conclude, the Greeks never justified the actions of 17 N. Yet they never 
included in their statements even the possibility of negotiating a ceasefire with the group, 
or the use of armed forces or the establishment of an emergency status. As a result, 
Greece’s anti-terrorist policy and planning had been characterized many times by 
incrementalism, fragmentation and ineptitude.62 
Far from sending an early and clear message that violence would not be tolerated 
by taking a very clear stand against that phenomenon and effective measures, state 
authorities and political parties allowed terrorism to grow and to become a routine 
element of Greek contemporary life.63 The lack of will, demonstrated by a few powerful 
groups in society and public apathy, had weakened the position of Greek society toward 
the terrorists. However, at that point, time was too short and the choices became fewer. 
The time had come to change the attitudes and behavior against terrorism, that salient 
violation of human rights and human values, which are the basis of democracy.   
After September 11, 2001, a significant doctrinal change emerged in Greek 
political life and was tied to the responsibility of hosting the 2004 Olympics Games. 
Terrorism became one of the top priorities of the Greek agenda, and the defeat of 17 N 
became the first priority for the state. Fortunately, experts from the FBI and Scotland  
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Yard were invited to Greece and were working alongside their Greek counterparts to 
bring the terrorists to a court of law. The hope was that this most promising cooperation 
would bring an end to the last active Greek terrorist group. 
The role of the secret intelligence services, both domestic and foreign, was 
prominent in dealing with that plague that curse and their constant and effective efforts 
contributed greatly to the final solution as well as to the disruption of these terrorists 
groups. The intelligence services under a democratic regime that contributed enormously 
to that undeclared war along with the proper legal framework that protected their 
activities were the major reason for that success against terrorism. With important 
technical and advisory help from British and Americans intelligence services, Greece 
vanquished completely these terrorist groups and further consolidated Greek’s 
democracy, always with the help from the political parties and from the Greek citizens.  
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IV. INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN GREECE IN THE POST-
DICTATORIAL ERA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Greece, following the tragic dictatorship had an extremely difficult time 
transitioning, consolidating the democratic regime.  
As Winston Churchill said in 1947:  
Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world 
of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect…indeed, it has 
been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except all 
those other forms that have been tried from time to time. 
Churchill’s words were in one sense, prophetic. Democracy was and remains a 
difficult and demanding task. However, democracy has expanded “dramatically,” since 
1974 when the third wave of democratization began. Democracy expanded from 27 
percent to approximately 61 percent of all nations during that period.64 In all these 
countries, democracy became “the only game in town” through the arduous processes of 
transition and consolidation. Also, as J. J. Linz and A. Stepan claim:  
A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been 
reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, 
when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and 
popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate 
new politics, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power 
generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other 
bodies de jure.65    
Therefore, for a new democracy to succeed at consolidation, it must possess the 
following five interacting arenas in order: a free and lively civil society, a relatively 
autonomous political society, a rule of law, a usable state bureaucracy and an economic  
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society.66 Specifically, concerning Greece, the fact that all the regime’s crises did not 
lead to a major threat to democracy is an apparent sign that democratic consolidation in 
the country was completely successful.   
Democracy is more than a regime, it is an interacting system in which no one 
arena of the previous five can function properly without support from the others. Also, 
one extremely important issue for that consolidation is the role and control of the 
intelligence community during the democratization period. The intelligence community 
played a crucial role during that time, but of course, most important was their role in 
bringing the Greek terrorist groups to justice. 
The Greek democratic regime controls its intelligence community through a legal 
framework. About how that community contributes to the war against terrorists, it is 
necessary to understand the exact historical origin of the Greek secret intelligence 
services, and its mission in modern Greek democratic society. Moreover, the phases of 
the intelligence process that these intelligence services have adopted to function better, 
the structure and formation of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), and finally, the 
legal framework under which the NIS functions are important elements for the 
understanding of the Greek intelligence services, the crucial and significant contribution 
of the intelligence services against the terrorist groups in Greece after the dictatorship. 
B. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE 
The establishment of the Secret Intelligence Service in Greece begun in 1926 
when the first efforts were made to create this extremely sensitive service for the 
country’s security. However, those attempts were not very productive and eventually the 
intelligence service was established in 1953, through the legislative decree 2421/1953,67 
under which the agency took the name Central Intelligence Service (KYP: Kentriki 
Ypiresia Pliroforion). The entire establishment was based on the standards of the Western 
Europe’s intelligence services, and the primary goal was the national security concerning 
threats from the northern borders (communist countries) and from the eastern borders 
(Turkey), which was a constant threat to the country. 
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Due to constant and different decrees at every turn, the Greek Secret Intelligence 
Services were subjected either to the Prime Minister or to the President of the Republic, 
and based on the last amendment; the agency is now subjected to the Prime Minister. 
Currently, all functions of the agency follow a new law established in 1986, 
which is the legislative decree 1645/1986, and the agency was renamed. Instead of being 
called the Central Intelligence Service (KYP), it was now called the National Intelligence 
Service (EYP: Ethniki Ypiresia Pliroforion). It is a self-standing civil agency directly 
responsible to the Prime Minister. The political head of the agency is the Minister of 
Order.68 
C. MISSION OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE 
The country’s national security is the main and most important mission of the 
National Intelligence Service (NIS). The objects and mission of the NIS, as included in 
the Law 1645/86, are69 
• To collect, process, and disseminate intelligence with respect to the 
country's national security to the competent authorities. 
• To confront the espionage activities implemented against the country by 
foreign intelligence officials. 
• To coordinate, within the framework of decisions made by the National 
Security Council and the Prime Minister, the activities of all intelligence 
and security agencies of the state in the sector of collection and 
dissemination of information connected within the scope of its authority. 
• To implement any other mission similar to the above-mentioned powers 
and that has been assigned to it by the National Security Council or the 
Prime Minister. 
All the above goals and objects of the NIS included in the new law, which 
determines the operation of the intelligence service, are part of the intelligence process. 
The term intelligence process refers to the various steps or stages in intelligence 
from politicians who need information about the society’s final product. Intelligence 
products result from a series of interrelated activities, which constitute the intelligence  
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cycle. The seven main steps of the intelligence cycle that follow are the principal 
intelligence functions: requirements, collection, process and exploitation, analysis and 
production, dissemination, consumption and feedback.70 
1. Requirements 
Each country has a variety of national security and foreign policy interests, and 
since that intelligence should be a supporter of policy and not a policy maker on its own, 
intelligence priorities must conform to the policy priorities.  
2. Collection 
Collection is the exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of 
the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of 
intelligence.71  
3. Process and Exploitation 
Process and exploitation is the phase before analysis, in which the intelligence 
personnel convert the collected information into a form suitable for analysis and 
production. This phase includes translation, decryption, interpretation and any other 
preparation needed for the information to be ready for the analysts.  
4. Analysis and Production 
Analysis and production is the phase of the intelligence process involving the 
most difficult task during which intelligence information is subjected to systematic 
examination in order to identify significant facts, derive conclusions and prepare reports 
for the intelligence consumers.72 As P. Gill states “It is at the analysis stage that 
“information” is converted into “intelligence.”73 
5. Dissemination  
Dissemination is the third phase of the intelligence process. In this phase the final 
product of the intelligence process is distributed from the producers to the consumers, 
within and outside the intelligence community, in a suitable form.74  
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6. Consumption 
According to many specialists, consumption, which is a new phase in the 
intelligence process, means how and in what degree the decision makers and policy 
makers take and use the intelligence issues.  
7. Feedback 
Feedback, the other new element in the process, perhaps, is a very important and 
very vital phase. Feedback is the last phase in which the consumers of finished 
intelligence interact with the intelligence managers and help them evaluate the 
effectiveness of intelligence community support, identify the intelligence gaps, and focus 
more precisely on consumer needs.  
D. STRUCTURE OF THE NIS  
Therefore, the coordination and cooperation of activities of all Security Agencies 
in Greece, with regards to the phases of collection and dissemination of information, as 
provided for by Article 2 of Law 1645/1986, is achieved through the following bodies:75 
• The KYSEA (Foreign Affairs and Defense Government Council) 
• The Intelligence Council 
• The Joint Steering Committee  
KYSEA, established in 1996 through a law, replaced the National Security 
Council (SEA). That new body retained all the powers of the previous organization and 
attributed extreme importance to the major guidelines of strategic importance concerning 
General Security and Public Policy Matters and to the guidelines on the implementation 
of decisions in the Ministries.76 
The Intelligence Council exercises coordination within the framework of the 
decisions issued by the KYSEA and the Prime Minister as well as within the framework 
of the activities implemented by all the Intelligence and Security agencies of the state 
concerning the collection and dissemination of intelligence relating to the objectives for 
which the NIS is responsible.77 This is accomplished with scheduled meetings of the 
Intelligence Council every two months, barring any emergencies. 
                                                 




The synthesis of the Intelligence Council is as follows:78 
• The NIS's Director General as Chairman 
• The Director of the Security Sector of the Ministry of Public Order 
• The Director of the 2nd Joint Staff Group of the National Defense General 
Staff 
• One appointed representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
addition to his alternate, by the Foreign Minister 
• Up to two persons appointed as well as an equal number of alternates 
appointed by the Prime Minister according to the nature of the issues 
being discussed.  
Finally, the Joint Steering Committee is responsible for conveying important 
proposals to the Intelligence Council and for checking and verifying the implementation 
of its decisions. The synthesis of that group is   
• The Vice-Governor A' (of the NIS's Operations Sector)  
• Representatives, according to each specific case, of the Ministry of 
National Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public 
Order and the appropriate State Agencies.  
• One representative from each of the NIS's Department.  
E. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The National Intelligence Service is under the close control and examination of:79 
i) the Special Committee for the Protection of Communication Privacy 
(Law 2225/1994) of Parliament, which is responsible for protecting the 
secrecy of correspondence, for ensuring compliance with the conditions 
for decisions taken by the authorities to suspend the rule of secrecy only 
for a limited time, ii) the Institution for the Protection of Personal Data 
(Law 2472/10-4-1997), which refers to the protection of rights and 
fundamental freedoms of individuals and particularly to the protection of 
private life. 
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V. THE ROLE AND THE LESSONS OF INTELLIGENCE IN 
GREECE DURING THE WAR ON TERRORISM 
A. CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES 
Maintaining control and oversight of intelligence services is a paramount 
obligation of a government. To be sure, a delicate balance of power between the 
intelligence community and the government is imperative to safeguard a democracy from 
abuse. Juvenal’s question, “Sed quis custodiet ipso custodies?” (But who will watch the 
watchdogs?) is as meaningful today at it was two thousand years ago. Controlling and 
overseeing intelligence agencies have worried democracies from their inception because 
oversight is necessary for the harmonious functioning of the state and the protection of its 
populace. 
Greece struggled with this perplexing issue when its democracy was restored 
following the demise of its seven-year military dictatorship. Prior to the fall of the 
dictatorship, Greek’s intelligence community was under the strict control of its dictator, 
Colonel George Papadopoulos. With the overthrow of his regime, Greek society was left 
suspicious and cynical of intelligence services. Cautiously, they began structuring a 
system of checks and balances that would suit a true democracy. 
Generally, intelligence operations are kept secret from the general population. 
Often basic security requirements contradict the fundamental principles of an open, 
democratic, and representative government. Supposedly, the agencies within the 
intelligence community are acting according to the democratic rule of law and for the 
greater good of national security. Thus, to deter, the intelligence agencies from the 
temptation of exceeding their authority and to avoid any abuse of citizens, the 
governments attempt to control and to oversee the intelligence services. Consequently, a 
delicate balance exists between that oversight and the efficiency of the intelligence 
agencies. Any attempted reform should improve the intelligence system without 
compromising either oversight or efficiency. In other words, any reform should increase 
national security without increasing the danger of abuse of the law or of the citizens. 
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Almost every country’s aspiration, ideally, is the creation of a nation-state, which 
will operate under democratic principles. This aspiration also includes the hope that the 
intelligence services will fully harmonize with these beliefs.  
Whatever oversight structures are developed, the preconditions for them to have a 
genuine, rather than a purely symbolic impact, are adequate resources, including full 
access to information and the political will to use it. There are basic principles that must 
be accepted. First, both managerial control and external oversight are required at each 
level of the agencies. Second, the same positions should not be responsible for both 
control and oversight. Third, positions responsible for control of security intelligence 
agencies should draft standards and guidelines that will be public in so far as they are 
compatible with the essential security needs and will increase, in particular, the nearer the 
level of control is to the agency itself. Fourth, each control position will be accountable 
for or responsible to the next level moving away from the agency. Fifth, the primary role 
of each oversight institution will be to report to the control institution at the same level.80  
Modern democracies use many techniques to control intelligence. Some of these 
techniques include the agency’s structure, executive oversight, legislative oversight, 
judicial oversight and media and public awareness. The method used by the Greek 
government is likely the most effective technique for them. This “legislative method” 
possesses the best means of oversight. The Parliament with Parliamentary oversight of 
committees possesses numerous means to legislative oversight of intelligence services 
successfully, such as budget, hearings, nominations and treaties.81 
Of course, extreme care should be given to the membership, powers and resources 
of those committees. Those committees must provide rigorous and intensive oversight 
and as such Parliament becomes a consistent player in shaping intelligence policy 
because when operating in secrecy, intelligence agencies are seen not simply as 
mysterious, but often as uncontrolled. 
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Clearly, legislative oversight alone is not the perfect way to the achieve 
accountability of the intelligence services, as even that method can raise a number of 
issues and problems that are difficult to solve. These issues are, for example, how much 
oversight is enough, as there is no objective way to decide the right level of oversight, 
how much money is enough for intelligence, whether or not it is proper to reveal 
intelligence to the public, and the amount of secrecy which is necessary during the 
oversight process.  
However, as mentioned previously, legislative oversight has the means, the right 
and the obligation to supervise the intelligence services. As a result, this type of oversight 
is the most proper and the most efficient for that purpose. 
B. THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE 
Generally, intelligence is defined as a process, a product and an organization. As a 
process, intelligence entails the acquisition and production of intelligence, as a product, 
the analyses, and as an organization, the agencies that carry out the intelligence 
functions.82 Many people consider intelligence only in terms of military information, 
weapons capabilities, secret attack plans, and so forth, but while that part of intelligence 
is significant, it is not the exclusive part. Political intelligence, economic intelligence, 
social intelligence, environmental intelligence and cultural intelligence are also very 
important components. 
Intelligence concerns issues related to national security. The pursuit of secret 
information is the mainstay of intelligence activity. Intelligence exists because 
governments try to hide information from other governments, which in turn, try to 
discover hidden information. It is important to distinguish between intelligence and 
information. Information is anything that can be known, regardless of how it may be 
discovered, while intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood 
needs of policy makers and has been collected, refined and narrowed to meet those 
needs.83  
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Thus, all intelligence is information, but not all information is intelligence. In an 
intelligence mission, the primary intelligence function is only to inform on policy and to 
support and help the decision-making process. Intelligence is used in making policy and 
not in implementing policy. Any other activity is either wasteful or illegal. As the authors 
of the Federalist wrote,  
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to 
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would 
be necessary. In framing a government, which is to be administrated by 
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government 
to control the governed and in the next place oblige it to control itself.84 
It is necessary for the people to know what the actions of the government are, and 
with that knowledge, the citizens might be able to control all the secret actions because 
secrecy is the enemy of democracy. However, on the other hand, much intelligence is 
necessarily secret and cannot be shared with the people because the risk of disclosure of a 
secret increases with the number of people who know it.  
All of these concepts had much do with Greece because Greece was a new 
democracy in 1974, which tried to find the necessary strength to stand independently and 
overcome all the problems that the seven years of dictatorship had created. These 
problems, including terrorism, required intelligence far greater than ever before.  
C. THE NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE 
To justify the need for intelligence in Greece and elsewhere, examining the 
threats and imminent hazards to the state and to the nation is extremely important because 
they can have direct consequences even to the existence of the country. Also, threats to 
national security, over a relatively brief span of time, degrade the quality of life for the 
inhabitants of a state, or significantly threaten to narrow the range of policy choices 
available to the government of a state or to private, non-governmental entities within the 
state.85 
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According to Buzan, there are five main threats: military, political, societal, 
economic and ecological, and the main measure that defines them as issues of national 
security is their intensity.86 Intensity would include the threat’s specificity, its nearness in 
space and time, its probability, the weight of its consequences and whether or not 
perceptions of a particular threat are reinforced by previous experience. There is no 
distinction between foreign and domestic threats, but it is acceptable that political, 
societal and economic threats are more likely to characterize the main sources of a 
domestic threat. All these threats have, as a result, the demand for intelligence services 
capable of confronting them and protecting a country’s interests with total success. 
Therefore, intelligence is necessary for at least four major reasons.87 First, to 
avoid strategic surprise, as the salient goal of any intelligence community, is to watch 
carefully threats, events and developments that have the ability and intent to harm the 
nation’s existence.  
Second, intelligence is also necessary because through intelligence, creating long-
term expertise is easier, especially for national security issues in which a great deal of 
knowledge and experience exists in that community. A consensus on basic national 
interests and an enduring framework can be created so that even the short-term policies 
can be compatible. Third, intelligence is essential because it supports the policy process, 
as politicians always need timely intelligence, which will provide information and 
warning of risks and benefits for issues of national security. A fourth reason for 
intelligence is to maintain secrecy. Without such secrecy, nation’s needs are always 
subject to breach of security. Secrecy makes intelligence special and unique for its 
services to society.  
According to these four essentials, a huge difference does not exist between 
peacetime and wartime, and there is no clear distinction between those two periods for 
intelligence, even though many people believe there is. The material that will be gathered 
through intelligence process determine a country’s stance on national security because 
the first purpose of the intelligence community is to protect the nation at all times. 
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Especially concerning Greece, in 1974, when the situation was complicated by the 
emergence of terrorist groups, which increased domestic violence, the Intelligence 
Services, both domestic and foreign, had to play a major role in order to provide society 
with a solution.  
D. THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE AGAINST THE TERRORISTS 
Until the summer of 1974, for Greece’s intelligence and the security services the 
main goal was to protect society from the communist threat. Although the first 
democratic government made numerous reforms after the dictatorship, the inadequacy of 
these reforms prompted no improvement. The intelligence services’ methods, tactics and 
ethos remained almost identical as before.88 They did not understand exactly what the 
terrorists wanted, their goals and their failure. The intelligence services did not 
understand in depth, the nature and the dynamics of the terrorists, a fact that contributed 
much to that tragic failure for too many years; a failure which had incalculable costs for 
the reputation and credibility of Greece throughout civilized society. Probably, with 
better cooperation and coordination among the government, the police, the judiciary and 
the intelligence services, the terrorists groups would have been more vulnerable and more 
easily identified and captured.  
Furthermore, a large amount of money was spent on the security and intelligence 
services and a number of informers and agents. Yet, this did not reduce the terrorist 
attacks.89 For those who knew more about these organizations, there were indications of 
corruption at every step. According to these people, it would have been better for the 
government to dissolve these services and establish totally new ones rather than to try to 
reform them, with measures, half measures and ideas that would be approved but would 
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As a former governmental advisor on terrorism, Mary Bossis, had declared 
“Governments, both left and right, generally agreed that it was much safer to keep the 
secret services faction-riven, inefficient and dependant on political control and patronage 
than to modernize them into a powerful intelligence apparatus.”90 
Moreover, various problems had emerged due to bureaucratic jealousies between 
and within different state agencies. These ranged from the lack of meritocracy in the 
Greek police, the low educational level of recruits, outdated training and the duplication 
of functions.91 While absolute discipline and perfect operational performance were 
necessary to deal with armed and merciless terrorists, the security and intelligence 
services in Greece never showed these capabilities, and in many circumstances, they were 
exposed to public opinion along with the crucial mistakes made in their attempts to 
capture the terrorists. 
One really remarkable attempt made by the Greek government in 1994 was the 
establishment of an anti-terrorist think tank, the Scientific Committee for the Analysis, 
Investigation and Planning against Organized Crime.92 The main role of this think tank 
would be to provide, via research and information analysis, guidelines in terms of the 
appropriate policy the intelligence and security services should follow in order to get 
close to and eliminate the terrorists. That venture, completely supported by the United 
States, as the U.S. Diplomatic Security Service’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance Office, 
provided a great deal of advice about the operation of this think tank, as well as the 
development of a Greek-American Task Force against the terrorist groups.93 However, 
and unfortunately for the country, this attempt turned out to be extremely short-lived, and 
the think tank was dissolved after just two years, and thus, one more attempt by the 
government was lost.  In addition, as previously mentioned, numerous changes in the 
leadership of Greece’s law enforcement departments and agencies and continuous  
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changes of policy, made the implementation of one concrete, permanent and strict 
approach to the problem almost impossible. For example, there were eight anti-terrorist 
branch chiefs between 1989 to 1998. 
Therefore, even though a plethora of policies had been followed and various 
measures had been taken to confront the threat of terrorism, nothing had been achieved 
and all these attempts proved to be futile. The Greek authorities were no closer to one 
impending solution. Amazingly, not a single arrest of a member of the terrorist groups, or 
one discovery of a terrorist hideout occurred for more than twenty-five years. As a result, 
a general outcry rose among the Greek population as well as from the foreign countries 
there were friendly to Greece. The latter felt that their people were unprotected and prey 
to the hands and desires of a few merciless terrorists while according to these foreign 
countries, the official Greek government had no cohesive policy against terrorism. 
The real breakthrough came, unfortunately, after another murderous attack, the 
attack against the British military attaché in Greece, Brigadier Stephen Saunders in June 
2000. That murder was well prepared and planned and made clear that the terrorists had 
accurate information about the Brigadier’s way of life. He paid with his life, according to 
them, for Greece’ role in NATO’s air strikes against the former Yugoslavia, even though 
the British Minister of Defense denied any connection between the Brigadier and the air 
strikes.  
As the Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou declared on CNN, 
We are all much more dedicated and determined to eradicate this 
particular group which has continuously, over the last decades, been able 
to carry out acts of such sorts against both Greek and foreign targets. We 
are working very closely with the international community and of course, 
with the U.S. and Britain in this case to work and find the perpetrators and 
we will battle against them until we are successful.94 
A report that had been issued just one week earlier, by a U.S. congressional 
commission, had designated Greece as “not cooperating fully” against terrorism, and 
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stated that “Greece has been disturbingly passive in response to terrorist attacks.”95 
Likewise, the U.S. State Department had described Greece as “one of the weakest links” 
in anti-terrorism efforts in Europe,96 and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told 
CNN, “the Clinton administration is pressing Greece to step-up their anti-terrorism 
efforts.”97 
Apart from the international pressure on Greece to demonstrate progress against 
its native terrorism after all these attacks, another issue was also extremely important to 
the Greek government: the Olympic games of 2004. They would be the first Olympic 
games of the new century, and it had been decided that they would take place in their 
birthplace of Greece. Greece was concerned about the security of the Olympic Games 
because a terrorist attack would leave no margin of success. It would also irreparably 
destroy the image of the country abroad. Greece was interested in enhancing the benefits 
of the upcoming games, both politically and financially, and to prevent any criticism. 
Greece, additionally, recalled vividly that their nation bordered extremely 
sensitive places such as the Middle East and North Africa, the memories of the 1972 
Olympic Games, during which terrorist attacks occurred, and the events of September 11, 
2001 and the instability that prevailed everywhere. Consequently, Greece considered the 
security and protection of the games very carefully.  
Greece's previous failure to accept and to solve its terrorist problem had cost the 
country greatly. Greece’s original proposal to host the Olympic Games budgeted $5 
million. This amount had to be changed often, and a minimum of $600 million had been 
budgeted for security infrastructure and equipment, while the most modest estimates 
predict the cost may approach $1 billion, and 45,000 full time uniformed personnel were 
designated for the security of the Olympics.98 When comparing this to the Salt Lake City 
Olympic Games, whose costs in terms of security were $300 million, the importance and 
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the significance that the Greek authorities had given to that issue becomes very clear. As 
the security consultant for Athens 2004, Peter Ryan mentioned, “the cooperation is vital 
and the intelligence community is really rediscovering itself in terms of international 
cooperation.”99 
When combining all of these issues, it can be argued that the assassination of 
Brigadier Stephen Saunders and its timing seems to have been the last straw and was the 
crucial turning point that changed the overall Greek policy concerning terrorism. 
Simultaneously, the assassination caused the American and the British intelligence and 
security services to become directly involved in Greek political and social life by 
supporting the respective Greek authorities.  
Facing the risk of being considered a dangerous country, Greece attempted to 
develop and demonstrate a policy that would protect the country from the possibility of 
such events occurring again. The international clamor that the Brigadier Stephen 
Saunders’ murder created made everyone in Greece demand more drastic and effective 
measures in the war with those criminals. 
Therefore, with their intervention, British agents clearly stated that the best 
weapon against terrorism as well as the best counter terrorism weapon was intelligence, 
and good intelligence at that. Although the reactive investigations conducted after attacks 
are certainly useful, for crimes such as terrorism, the best tactics are preventive in order 
to be able to prevent the impending disaster, and not only to find out what exactly 
happened when everything is done.  
Due to all these pressures, the Greek government eventually accepted foreign 
assistance in order to enhance its counter terrorism capabilities and operations after the 
murder of the British defense attaché, Brigadier Stephen Saunders. On June 6, 2000, the 
day Saunders was murdered, the British flew a team to Athens at the invitation of the 
Greek government, and they soon established a permanent base dedicated to assisting in 
solving the murder, an objective with potential international ramifications.100 It was the 
first time that Scotland Yard had a permanent body of officers posted abroad.  
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Of course, many problems arose between the different services because Britain 
and Greece shared absolutely different political, judicial and constitutional cultures. This 
fact made the attempt at cooperation and coordination between them an achievement 
beyond any expectation. The previous example of the U.S. agents who had helped to train 
personnel suitable for anti-terrorist activities, who had offered intelligence and a great 
deal of advice on how to handle and solve the problem, and finally had faced only 
mistrust, suspicions and escalation of anti-American sentiments within the Greek 
government and in public opinion, resulted in the British agents paying more attention in 
order to avoid the same outcome.  
The British agents provided the relevant Greek agents and police officers the 
equivalent of an advanced course in evidential standards, crime-scene management and 
discretion.101 They offered them a different point of view, a different perception of the 
terrorists’ attacks, their tactics, their real motivations, and the handling and examination 
of evidence. They tried to go more in-depth concerning the behavior of their members, 
their unique characteristics, always according to the records that they had gathered 
throughout the years and after so many murderous attacks. Further examination of all the 
terrorists’ attacks from the beginning was an attempt to understand every detail, their 
techniques, their methods, and to discover new evidence that would lead to the 
elimination of the group. Finally, the British tried to offer a realistic theory to the Greeks 
about the reasons for the existence and continuity of that terrorist group. 
The first step to full cooperation was a counter terrorism seminar that took place 
on July 11th and 12th just one month after Saunders' murder and included high-level UK 
security personnel and relevant Greek ministers, such as the Minister of Public Order, the 
Foreign Minister and the British Ambassador. UK police officers suggested the 
development of more sophisticated surveillance techniques and engagement as well as 
the use of the media in the battle against terrorism. The Greek government accepted and 
agreed to reorganize their security forces and to form a single anti-terrorist body 
following the UK example of the British CTPD.102 Afterwards, the two countries 
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engaged in joint anti-terrorism exercises and mutual cooperation and coordination began, 
aided, to a large degree, by the previous and lengthy experience of the British forces in 
counter terrorism in Northern Ireland against the IRA.  
Further recommendations about changes in the existing anti-terrorist law, in order 
to gain the support of the entire population in volunteering information to the police, to 
increase punishments for terrorism attacks, and to increase the authorities’ 
independence103 were completely adopted after the British exhortation.   
The British authorities tried from the beginning to keep the Saunders spirit alive 
and to keep that murder a constant reminder for everyone, in order to lead British and 
Greek politicians, their acts and thoughts and also to act as a protective platform for 
victimized relatives and 17 N survivors to dare to speak out finally.104 An entire publicity 
campaign was created, which included moments of silence, broadcasting anti-terrorism 
messages over the public communication networks and even the involvement of the 
Greek Orthodox Church and its traditions, services and its influence over the common 
people. 
Additionally, Saunders’ widow made a few appearances on television and tried to 
instigate the common sentiment, and asked for the help of the people against terrorism 
and their help in order to identify her husband’s killers. 
It is certain that the complete use of the mass media had several goals to fulfill, and it 
was a strategy that was followed on purpose by the Greek authorities under the counsels 
and the supervision of their British colleagues. The most important of these reasons were 
without a doubt the following:105 
• To unite the Greek public against a common enemy 
• To put pressure on the public to reveal any piece of information they 
might have 
• To send a clear signal to the entire world, mainly the United States and the 
European Union, that Greece was determined to fight terrorism 
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• To clear the accusations levied about any possible involvement of a few 
politicians with the terrorist groups 
• To send a clear message to the terrorists that they had no public support at 
all.  
Eventually, in order to train the trainers and to convey all their professionalism 
and expertise, the UK officers held seminars with Greek colleagues, using whiteboards 
where, apparently for the first time, they talked about their concerns and marked out ideas 
for improving the Greek services. It is distinctive that Alan Fry, the head of the UK's  
anti-terrorist branch, emphasized the “willingness of the Greek authorities to have others 
scrutinize their previous work” and for “accepting criticism” was in part due to 
unprecedented pressure on the Greek state to act against terrorism.106 
All the above measures, combined with the perfect cooperation and coordination 
between British and Greek agents of the intelligence and the security services, certainly 
helped enormously in apprehending the terrorist groups 17 N and ELA. It is more than 
certain that the training of the people in the anti-terrorist groups in Greece by their British 
and American colleagues mainly made them capable of using and exploiting even the 
minimum of the evidence that they found after a member of the group of 17 N detonated 
an explosive in Piraeus during the summer of 2002.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Undoubtedly, the terrorists never accomplished their ultimate goals: to gain 
popular support, to incite a revolution, and to force the state to change its foreign and 
domestic policies. Yet until all members of the organization have been arrested, it is 
highly that 17N will voluntarily abandon its campaign of violence. 
No one can deny that a truly successful anti-terrorist policy is one that vastly 
reduces or eliminates the amount of violence. Fortunately, over the past years, the 
violence in Greece decreased, but contrary to the other Greek terrorist groups, 17 N still 
continues to murder even while in decline. This is true because small and extremely 
sophisticated nature of this particular terrorist group made it very difficult for the security 
services to infiltrate and defeat. When difficult economic measures were adopted and 
crises with Turkey occurred, 17 N only used these problems as an excuse to strike and 
raise the violence to a peak, even Greek’s economic growth did little to reduce the level 
of violence. 
Admirably, during the war against the terrorists, the Greek state overcame the 
temptation to restrict civil liberties and to transform the nation into an undemocratic 
police state. Likewise, in a democracy, statutory regulation of the media’s coverage of 
terrorism is neither feasible nor desirable, so media self-restraint and self-resolution were 
the best policy options when the political elites were unable to agree on a common 
definition of political violence and the political environment became so polarized. This 
led to an incoherent approach to countering terrorism.  
The Greek police and Greek intelligence services, with significant technical and 
advisory help from British and Americans colleagues, successfully regained some of their 
credibility after being purged in the aftermath of the military dictatorship. Similarly, the 
same success became obvious in Greek democracy, which gained credibility. The fact 
that multiple crises did not lead to a major threat to the democratic institutions could be 




As the Foreign Minister George Papandreou declared:  
The fall of November 17 is a turning point. It symbolizes the deep-rooted 
democratic institutions of the country, how much this group became 
isolated from society and public opinion. After the civil war and the 
military junta, the willingness of Greeks to cooperate with security and 
intelligence forces shows a mature democracy.107 
Problems, which could have possibly materialized, especially in a new democracy 
because of the kind of intelligence services operations undertaken, hopefully will never 
become part of Greek’s normal political life.  
During the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime, two 
functions of intelligence that are beyond its jurisdiction and legality, exist: 
counterintelligence and covert actions. These are extremely important and usually create 
many serious problems for democratic institutions concerning their legitimacy and abuse 
of civil rights. Greece’s leadership, fortunately, in pursuing these terrorist groups 
exercised these options with virtually no abuse of democratic ideals. 
“Counterintelligence” refers to efforts taken to protect one’s country intelligence 
operations from penetration and disruption by hostile nations or by their intelligence 
services.108 The other important function is “covert operations.” Highly important and 
sensitive is the legitimacy of such operations and whether these operations should be 
assigned to intelligence services.  
Covert operations are designed to produce a result in a foreign country secretly.109 
In general, there are three main categories of covert action. The first is propaganda that 
includes the unethical exercise of influence through the media to spread false rumors. The 
second is political action in which funding or other kinds of support to political parties, 
unions etc., take a significant and active role in a foreign country. The third, a 
paramilitary activity, includes the use of force and actions such as assassination or 
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arming.110 Wherever Greece employed its intelligence community to battle terrorism, it 
held firm to its democratic convictions. At no time did the government adopt totalitarian 
tactics. 
Developing a professional and effective intelligence service and trying to avoid 
all the previous severe problems during their function requires a careful recruitment of 
staff, comprehensive and appropriate training, better organized personnel and procedures, 
greater specialization of functions, higher standards of discipline and significantly better 
pay111 to attract higher educated and capable people and to avoid corruption. 
It is certain that developing a professional, capable and democratically 
intelligence agency requires time and resources. Likewise, however, democratic 
development and consolidation requires time to be completed. Today, attempting to 
control the intelligence community in a country during a transition from an authoritarian 
regime to a democratic one is extremely arduous. Yet, if democratic ideas prevail, 
countries with a blotted past might move forward to a genuine form of democracy. 
Luckily, for Greece and for its democracy, the intelligence operations never transcended 
their legal or ethical boundaries at any time in Greece after the military dictatorship 
collapsed. 
Consolidation demands more than a commitment to democracy in the sense that 
democracy is simply considered the best form of government, and it is necessary for all 
members of society to believe that their country’s political system is worth obeying and 
defending.112 
Theodore Couloumbis, a well-known political analyst, at the Athens University, 
said that all the events that happened in Greece from the summer of 2002 were a “sea of 
change,” a total change for the people. The Greek citizens have begun to believe in  
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themselves and to view the country as a more modern European state, which crossed 
eventually and forever the threshold from an unstable democracy to a consolidated 
one.113 
To conclude, the strategic priorities of the great powers are not those adopted 
from 1950 to 1990. The Cold War is moribund, and Greece is no longer a fragile 
democracy emerging from a seven-year dictatorship. Therefore, the Greek state and the 
political parties correctly adopted a clear sense of strategic priorities and a coherent 
approach to achieving the end of terrorism and prohibiting terrorism to become a routine 
element of the nation’s life.  
In this new environment, with the state’s firm response, which has been 
implemented, and which combined the complete and appropriate cooperation and 
coordination of the government, the foreign and domestic intelligence and security 
forces, and the legislature, 17 N and ELA fortunately ceased to exist. 
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